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THE END OF THE BERNARDIN ERA
Cardinal Joseph L. Bernardin died on November 14, 1996, after a moving and pro-
foundly Christian battle with pancreatic cancer that edified Americans across the 
political and religious spectrums. Fourteen years after his holy death, the cardinal is 
remembered primarily for his end-of-life ministry to fellow cancer sufferers, for his 
chairmanship of the committee that produced the Ameri can bishops’ 1983 pastoral 
letter “The Challenge of Peace,” and for his advocacy of a “consistent ethic of life.” 
Those achievements were not the whole of the Bernardin story, however.
In his prime, Joseph Bernardin was arguably the most powerful Catho lic 
prelate in American history; he was certainly the most consequential since the hey-
day of James Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore in the late nine teenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. When he was in his early forties, Bernardin was the central figure 
in defining the culture and modus operandi of the U.S. bishops’ conference. Later, 
when he be came archbishop of Cincinnati and cardinal archbishop of Chicago, 
Bernardin’s concept and style of episcopal ministry set the pattern for hundreds 
of U.S. bishops. Bernardin was also the undisputed leader of a potent network of 
prelates that dominated the affairs of the American hierarchy for more than two 
decades; observers at the time dubbed it the “Bernardin Machine.” The machine’s 
horsepower inevitably diminished after the cardinal’s death. But it was still thought 
by many to have enough gas left in the tank to elect Bishop Gerald Kicanas of 
Tucson (who had begun his episcopal career as one of Bernardin’s auxiliaries) as 
president of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) this past 
November.
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It didn’t. Bishop Kicanas was defeated for the con ference presidency by 
Archbishop Timothy Dolan of New York in a vote that left those bishops who still 
adhered to the Bernardin model speechless in disbelief. And if their stunned silence 
following the announcement of the vote did not conclusively demonstrate the point, 
the reaction to Archbishop Dolan’s election in self-identified Catholic progressive 
circles—which ranged from bitterly disappointed to just plain bitter—confirmed 
that an era had ended and a corner had been turned in the history of Catholicism in 
the United States.
The Bernardin Era is over and the Bernardin Machine is no more. Under-
standing what that era was about, and what that machine embodied, is important 
for understanding the options that have now been opened for a different pattern of 
episcopal leadership in the Catholic Church in the United States and a different 
mode of engagement between the Church and American public life.
The era and the machine reflected the background, the perspective on the 
U.S. Catholic experience, and the ecclesiasti cal and political convictions of the 
man for whom both epoch and network were named.
Joseph Louis Bernardin was born in 1928 in Co lumbia, South Carolina, 
a son of Italian immigrants. Columbia was, and is, in the American Bible Belt, so 
Bernardin grew up in the least Catholic part of the United States—unlike, say, the 
prelates of his gen eration who were products of a vibrant Catholic ur ban culture in 
the Northeast and Midwest. Some of them may have lacked Bernardin’s gracious 
manners and polish, but they never doubted that Catholics belonged in the United 
States. By contrast, an alert young man growing up in South Carolina in the years 
after the Al Smith presidential debacle could not have been unaware of Catholics 
being profoundly other, indeed suspect.
After briefly exploring a career in medicine, Bernardin discerned a call to the 
priesthood, studied philosophy at St. Mary’s Seminary in Baltimore and theology 
at the Catholic University of America, and was ordained a priest for the Diocese of 
Charleston in 1952. His ascent up the ecclesiastical ladder was swift, with Father 
Bernardin becoming Monsignor Bernardin only seven years after his ordination. In 
fourteen years in Charleston, Bernardin served four different bishops in a variety 
of administrative posts prior to being chosen auxiliary bishop of Atlanta. In April 
1966, Bernardin received his episcopal ordination from the hands of Atlanta’s first 
metropolitan archbishop, Paul Hallinan, the beau ideal of the post-conciliar bishop 
within the progressive wing of the American Church and one of the grandfathers of 
the Bernardin Era and the Bernardin Machine. The other grandfather, John Cardi-
nal Dearden of Detroit, plucked Bernardin from Atlanta to become the first general 
secretary of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) in 1968.
Bernardin and Dearden were the two dominant figures in the formative years 
of what was then a dyad: the NCCB, known internally as “the body,” and the Uni-
ted States Catholic Conference (USCC), the NCCB’s public-policy arm. Dearden 
famously took counsel with the Booz Allen Hamilton manage ment-consultant firm 
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in designing the dyad’s structure and procedures. But it was Bernardin who, more 
than anyone else, defined the structure’s bureaucratic ethos, which deferred to “the 
body’s” authority while establishing a conference “process” that gave its bureau-
cracy significant power and influence in U.S. Catholic affairs. As the conference’s 
voice increased, that of individual bishops tended to decrease.
Bernardin’s sustained influence on the conference’s approach to public po-
licy was frequently linked to the considerable impact of the man who became one 
of the NCCB/USCC’s most influential staff members: the Rev. J. Bryan Hehir, 
a Boston priest with a Harvard doctorate who arrived in 1973. Hehir and Bernardin 
shared an ecclesiology (sympathetic to the progressive wing of the post-conciliar 
spectrum, but careful not to appear radical); a politics (similarly tilted à gauche, but 
always with an eye toward “the center”); and a determination to put the NCCB and 
the USCC “in play” in American public life and keep it there. That determination, 
and the bureaucratic steps taken to give it force, were embodied in Bernardin’s 
style of leadership, which was silken on the outside (for Joseph L. Bernardin was 
a thoroughly charming man) and quite tough on the inside (for Bernardin knew 
what he wanted the conference to do, knew how to make the conference do it, and 
knew how to get anyone who might be an obstacle out of the way).
Once Bernardin had finished his term as conference general secretary, Cardi-
nal Dearden wanted him to have room to “operate,” as the Detroit prelate once put 
it. And that, in Dearden’s terms, meant that Bernardin ought to become the head of 
a large Midwestern diocese, en route to a traditional cardi nalatial see. Thus in No-
vember 1972 Bernardin was named archbishop of Cincinnati, where he remained 
as metropolitan for a decade. But Bernardin’s work was not limited to the city that 
specializes in chili with chocolate (a culinary curiosity that may have caused some 
distress to the archbishop, who knew his way around an Italian kitchen). In 1974, 
after a three-year interregnum in which Philadelphia’s John Cardinal Krol served 
as NCCB/USCC president, Ber nardin became the conference president, commuted 
regularly between Cincinnati and Washington, and put the Bernardin Machine into 
high gear. He was succeeded as conference president by five men (John Quinn, 
John Roach, James Malone, John May, and Daniel Pilarczyk) who were all mem-
bers of the Bernardin Machine, and whose positions in the U.S. Church had no little 
to do with Bernardin’s service on the Vatican’s Congregation for Bishops (which 
Andrew Greeley once dubbed the “patronage office”) and Bernardin’s relationship 
with Belgian archbishop Jean Jadot, the Vatican representative in Washington from 
1974 to 1980. In those halcyon days, Bernardin, master of the scene, could, with 
quiet confidence and no fear of contradiction, tell fellow American clerics that, 
“No, Jim Malone won’t be the next archbishop of Cincinnati, but he will be the next 
president of the conference.”
The Bernardin Machine’s approach to gov ernance within the Church was 
frequent ly described as “collegial,” but those clergy and laity who, in their dioceses 
or in their interaction with the NCCB/USCC, felt the sting of authoritarian Catholic 
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liberal ism in the 1970s and 1980s would likely demur. For the Machine was quite 
rigorous in enforcing its eccle siology and its politics, and it was perfectly capable 
of withdrawing its favor when bishops once thought loyal club members showed 
signs of intellectual or ecclesiastical independence. One prominent example was 
now-retired Cardinal James Francis Stafford. Stafford was thought part of the Ber-
nardin world when he was named a member of the U.S. delegation to the 1980 
Synod of Bishops on the family. But he eventually took a different path, in part be-
cause of his unhappiness with how Bernardin, also a member of the Synod, quietly 
tried to maneuver that body’s deliberations into a critique of Paul VI’s teaching on 
the morally appropriate way to regulate births in Humanae Vitae.
Stafford was surprised at this, but he shouldn’t have been. For the Bernardin 
Era and the style of governance characteristic of Bernardin Machine bish ops were 
deeply influenced by the Roman-brokered “Truce of 1968,” an ill-fated attempt to 
settle the dis ciplinary situation in the Archdiocese of Washington, where dissent 
from Humanae Vitae was widespread and public. Whatever the Vatican’s intentions 
vis-à-vis the difficult situation in Washington, what was learned from the truce 
were two lessons that would shape an entire era of U.S. Catholic history. The first 
lesson was that the Holy See would retreat from rig orously enforcing doctrinal 
discipline if it could be persuaded of the danger of schism. The second lesson was 
that American bishops were ill advised to go out on a public limb in defense of 
Catholic teaching (as Patrick Cardinal O’Boyle of Washington had done by disci-
plining priests who had publicly rejected Humanae Vitae), for that could result in 
the Holy See sawing off the limb and leaving the bishop in question in a bad way.
Keeping peace within dioceses in the wake of the post–Humanae Vitae cha-
os thus became one of the prime imperatives of bishops adhering to the Bernardin 
model, even if that meant tolerating a measure of what Father Charles Curran liked 
to call “faithful dissent.” Bishops who condoned “faithful dissent” were unlikely 
to be vigorous in enforcing catecheti cal standards or liturgical discipline. Their 
approach to problems of clerical indiscipline and malfeasance also helped shape 
the ecclesiastical culture in which bishops turned to psychology rather than moral 
and sacramental theology in dealing with cases of the sexual abuse of the young.
As for its interaction with American pub lic life, the Bernardin Machine was 
con structed at a moment when few could imagine a former Hollywood B-movie 
actor as president of the United States and a Democratic majority seemed locked 
in place on Capitol Hill. Thus the USCC in its first decades came to be regarded 
in Washington as an adjunct of the Democratic majority in the Congress, even as 
the bishops took some tentative steps into the murky worlds of radical activism by 
creating the Campaign for Human Development, which began to support programs 
of community organizing modeled on or promoted by Saul Alinsky’s Industrial 
Areas Foun dation.
Yet for all their occasional playing with Alinskyite fire, the politics of the 
bishops’ conference during the Bernardin Era were more reflective of a determina-
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tion to position the Catholic Church as part of a lib eral vital center than they were 
of the politics of the American hard left. A fine example of Bernardin’s cast of mind 
and method in moving the bishops to address contested issues this way may be 
found in his chairmanship of the special NCCB committee charged with drafting 
a national pastoral letter on war and peace after the unthinkable had happened, the 
B-movie actor was in residence at 1600 Pennsyl vania Avenue, and fears of a Re-
agan-initiated nuclear war were considered quite rational in U.S. Catholic leader-
ship, intellectual, and activist circles.
Archbishop Bernardin’s shaping of the war/peace committee was a classic 
expression of his ecclesial and political style. As for the bishop-members of the 
com mittee, get the pacifist (Thomas Gumbleton) and the former military chaplain 
(John J. O’Connor) aboard in order to define the “extremes,” then appoint two 
other bishops who could be counted on to follow the lead of Bernardin and the 
committee’s chief staffer, Father Hehir, in defining the liberal “consensus.” That 
was clever, if not terribly original, bureaucratic maneuvering. What was more tel-
ling was Bernardin’s instruction to the committee members at the begin ning of the-
ir work: namely, that the one policy option they would not consider was unilateral 
nuclear disar mament. For that option, adopted, would brand the bishops as cranks 
who would no longer be “in play” in the public-policy debate.
Yet, one wanted to ask at the time (and one wants to ask now), why not? If 
the bishops’ committee on war and peace was an ecclesial body that would be gin 
with moral theology and work its way to public policy from there, surely every po-
licy option ought to have been on the table. Despite his insistence that the bishops 
were approaching this complex set of problems as “pastors and teachers” (a mantra 
of the bishops’ conference), Bernardin’s preemptive exclu sion of the unilateralist 
option made clear that this was an exercise in which political criteria of viability 
would play a considerable role.
In the event, and despite all efforts to stay “in play,” “The Challenge of Pe-
ace” quickly became a dead letter. Its recommendations on arms control were over-
run by the debate inaugurated by the Rea gan administration’s Strategic Defense In-
itiative, as its assumption of the relative permanence of the Cold War became moot 
after the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989–1991. “The Challenge of Peace” 
sought to make a contribution to easing the undoubted dan gers of the Cold War. By 
paying minimal attention to the potential of human rights activism in chang ing the 
internal political dynamics of the Soviet bloc, however, the bishops’ letter missed 
what turned out to be the key, not simply to managing the superpower competition, 
but to freedom’s victory over tyranny. (In his own reading of the undercurrents of 
history in the 1980s, Bernardin took a conventional liberal view. After a fellow gu-
est at a dinner party in 1991 had spoken of John Paul II’s pivotal role in the col lapse 
of European communism, Bernardin, asked for his opinion, said that he thought 
Mikhail Gorbachev had been the key figure.)
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Even during the years of its greatest influence, when Bernardin appeared on 
the cover of Time and his allies seemed fully in control of the bishops’ conference, 
the Bernardin Machine was not omnipotent. Bernardin and those of his cast of 
mind seem not to have con sidered the possibility that, post–Paul VI, the College 
of Cardinals in 1978 would anticipate the American electorate in 1980 and do the 
unthinkable: elect a fifty-eight-year-old Pole with a sharp mind, a charis matic per-
sonality, and a firm will as bishop of Rome. It took some time for the effects of this 
dramatic change in the Vatican to be felt. Thus John Paul II, who seems to have had 
some doubts about the matter (perhaps because of that 1980 Synod on the family), 
nonetheless acceded to the wishes of the Bernardin-dominated U.S. hierarchy by 
appointing Archbishop Bernardin as archbishop of Chicago in 1982 and nomina-
ting him to the College of Cardinals in 1983.
But if John Paul was willing to have Joseph Bernardin in Chicago and in 
the College of Cardinals, he was not willing to have one of Bernardin’s protégés 
(and his former deputy at the bishops’ conference), Thomas C. Kelly, O.P., as arch-
bishop of New York after Terence Cardinal Cooke died in 1983. Kelly seems to 
have expected the appointment; he report edly remarked to fellow bishops at Co-
oke’s funeral that St. Patrick’s Cathedral would “take some get ting used to.” But in 
a surprise at least as great as the recent Dolan/Kicanas election, the post instead 
went to John J. O’Connor after John Paul II rejected the Bernardinian terna, or list 
of possible nominees, sub mitted by the Congregation for Bishops. (John Paul asked 
the secretary of the congregation, the Brazilian Dominican Lucas Moreira Neves, 
whether he was happy with the terna, on which Kelly’s name presum ably appeared 
in first place; Moreira Neves said he was not and pulled out the O’Connor file.)
O’Connor’s staunch and unyielding pro-life activism as archbishop of New 
York was crucial in keeping that issue alive at a moment when the pro-life energies 
of the American episcopate showed some signs of flagging. In doing so, O’Con-
nor, who had very little use for bishops’ conference politics, set in place one of the 
markers that would eventu ally help displace the Bernardin approach to the Catholic 
Church’s interaction with the U.S. public-policy debate. After being named a car-
dinal in 1985, O’Connor’s work as a member of the Vatican Con gregation for Bi-
shops was also important in putting brakes on the power of the Bernardin Machine 
to reproduce itself episcopally.
A further sign that the ecclesiology and leadership style of the machine 
would not go uncontested dur ing John Paul II’s pontificate came in 1985, when 
the pope summoned an Extraordinary Assembly of the Synod of Bishops to mark 
the twentieth anniver sary of the conclusion of the Second Vatican Council and to 
consider the problems the Church had expe rienced in implementing the Council’s 
teaching. The pre-Synod period was dominated by debate over a book-length in-
terview with Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, The Ratzinger Report, which was sharply 
critical of the kind of implementation of the Council that Bernardin and his allies 
favored (and led). In retrospect, though, the turning point that the 1985 Synod re-
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presented for the Bernardin Machine and the Bernardin Era only came into focus 
in a press conference marking the Synod’s conclusion.
The Synod Fathers had recommended to the pope that a new catechism be 
written. Asked by a reporter at the post-Synod press conference what he thought 
of that, Bishop James Malone, then the NCCB president and very much Cardinal 
Bernardin’s ally, said that the reporter needn’t worry, as neither one of them would 
live long enough to see any such catechism published. Seven years later, John Paul 
II issued the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which gave lay people throughout 
the Church an instrument with which to contest “faithful dissent,” and which be-
gan a slow but steady catechetical revolution in which the adventure of orthodoxy 
would be stressed.
World Youth Day 1993 in Denver was another moment when a prescient 
observer might have sensed an ebbing in the Bernardin Machine’s power. John 
Paul was eager to hold a World Youth Day in the United States; the bishops’ confe-
rence and its Wash ington staff, which still reflected the default positions Bernardin 
had implanted during his years as general secretary and conference president, were 
dubious, to put it gently. But the pope insisted, so the conference proposed holding 
World Youth Day in either Buffalo (to take advantage of that city’s proximity to 
Canada) or Chicago (Bernardin’s base). John Paul, however, was intrigued by the 
idea of bringing World Youth Day to Denver, a self-consciously secular city where 
Archbishop J. Francis Stafford was working vigorously, and not without opposi-
tion, to bring the archdiocese of Denver out of the Bernardin Era. The Pope won the 
argument; World Youth Day 1993 in Denver was a tremendous success; and a mar-
ker was put down—the gospel without apology could be pro claimed with effect in 
a cultural environment that regarded the most challenging of gospel demands as 
bizarre. (Eleven years later, John Paul II was still chortling over his coup. Looking 
at photos of Rocky Mountain National Park outside Denver, the aged and crippled 
pontiff smiled, stabbed the photo album with his index finger, and said, “Denver! 
World Youth Day 1993. The American bishops said it couldn’t be done. I proved 
them wrong!”)
In the last decade and a half of his life, Bernardin continued to advance a di-
stinctive understand ing of Catholicism’s engagement with Ameri can politics. Even 
as work on “The Challenge of Peace” was being completed, the cardinal began 
promoting the concept of a “consistent ethic of life,” which linked issues such as 
abortion, capital punishment, and arms control in what was quickly styled the “se-
amless garment.” As articulated by Bernardin, the “consistent ethic” rooted itself 
in the foundational Catholic social–ethical principle of the dignity of the human 
person and then suggested a moral symmetry between the defense of unborn life in 
the womb, the rejection of the death penalty, and resistance to the rearmament pro-
grams of the Reagan administration. Cardinal Bernardin was a committed pro-lifer; 
charges that he developed the “consistent ethic” approach in order to give cover 
to liberal (and pro-choice) Catholic legislators who were “good on capital punish-
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ment and nuclear weapons” were false. Intentions aside, however, the “consistent 
ethic” did help buttress the Bernardin Machine’s “in play” approach to the Catholic 
Church and public policy, which inevitably blunted criticism of such de terminedly 
pro-abortion Catholic politicians as Ed ward M. Kennedy and Robert F. Drinan.
Shortly before his death in 1996, Bernardin ini tiated the “Catholic Com-
mon Ground Initiative,” an ongoing forum for fostering conversation across the 
spectrum of what had become, in the Clinton years, an increasingly polarized U.S. 
Church—a polarization that now seems, in retrospect, to re flect the further decline 
of the Bernardin Machine and the beginnings of an alternative correlation of for-
ces within the American hierarchy. Because the Initiative intended to include as 
full participants known dissenters from settled Catholic teaching, it was publicly 
criticized by former Washington arch bishop William Cardinal Baum and James 
Cardinal Hickey, then the incumbent in the nation’s capital, for promoting a false 
irenicism that tacitly accepted the notion of “faithful dissent.” Bernardin died be-
fore the Initiative could achieve any significant criti cal mass; perhaps any such 
outcome was unlikely, given the changing theological contours of the U.S. Catholic 
scene in general and the American epis copate in specific. In any case, it was unlike-
ly that “common ground” could be found with those dis senters who were in a state 
of psychological, if not canonical, schism, imagining themselves (as they did) the 
true Church of Vatican II. The Initiative nonethe less testified to Bernardin’s endu-
ring conviction that the liberal/progressive consensus that informed the Bernardin 
Era remained at the fifty-yard line of the U.S. Catholic playing field.
Three years after Cardinal Bernardin launched the Catholic Common Gro-
und Initiative, his successor as archbishop of Chicago, Francis Cardinal George, 
O.M.I., redefined that playing field con ceptually, declaring the liberal Catholic 
project dead in an October 1999 lecture to mark the seventy-fifth anniversary of 
Commonweal. Cardinal George’s re marks, which stressed a certain liberal Catho-
lic sur render to the ambient culture, brought into synthesis several trends that had 
been underway in U.S. Ca tholicism throughout the John Paul II years, trends that 
ultimately undermined the Bernardin Machine and that would ultimately draw the 
curtain on the Bernardin Era.
One of these trends, which became a hallmark of Cardinal George’s own 
presidency of the bishops’ con ference from 2007 to 2010, was an increased con-
cern among bishops, clergy, and engaged laity about Catho lic identity that touched 
issues as various as catechetics, liturgy, health care, and the relationship of Catholic 
institutions of higher learning to the local church and its bishop. A second trend was 
the emergence of pro-life activism as the cultural marker of serious Catholi cism in 
America. That trend, it should be noted, was itself accelerated by the U.S. bishops’ 
1998 statement, “Living the Gospel of Life,” which effectively replaced the “consi-
stent ethic”/“seamless garment” metaphors with a new image: the “foundations of 
the house of freedom,” in which the defense of innocent human life from concep-
tion until natural death was under stood to be fundamental, both theologically and 
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in terms of sound democratic theory, in a way that other public-policy questions 
engaging American Catholic attention were not. The third trend, most striking on 
campuses, was a willingness to reconsider, and in some instances enthusiastically 
embrace, the fullness of the Catholic ethic of human love, often by reference to 
John Paul II’s Theology of the Body.
When John Paul II sent Archbishop Pio Laghi to Washington as apostolic de-
legate in 1980, the pope ticked off on one hand his concerns about the Church in the 
United States. He was worried about the effectiveness of the Church’s evangelical 
mission, including the ways in which the sacraments were celebrated and religious 
education was conducted; he had serious reservations about the state of conse crated 
religious life in monasteries and convents; he thought priestly formation in semina-
ries needed to be tightened up; and he wanted a new approach to the appointment 
of bishops. The last amounted to a tacit instruction to dismantle the Bernardin Ma-
chine. It was an unlikely assignment for Laghi, who shared much of Joseph Bernar-
din’s ecclesiastical sensibility; and while Laghi’s arrival on Massachusetts Avenue 
did begin to blunt the capacity of the Bernardin Ma chine to reproduce itself by 
shaping the episcopal ap pointment process, it was the pontificate of John Paul II as 
a whole that proved the ultimate dismantler of the powerful ecclesiastical machine 
that Bernardin had built and operated with considerable skill.
John Paul II embodied a heroic model of the priest hood, and a heroic exer-
cise of the office of bishop, that had a profound effect, over-two-and-a-half de-
cades, on the Catholic priesthood and episcopate in the United States. The men who 
elected Timothy Dolan as USCCB president in November 2010 were men deeply 
influenced by the John Paul II model, as they were men intellectually formed by 
the Pol ish pope’s dynamic magisterium on questions rang ing from the Catholic 
sexual ethic to Catholic social doctrine. They understood, in a way that those who 
embodied the Bernardin Era did not quite seem to grasp, that it was important for 
the Catholic Church to be able to give a comprehensive, coherent, and compelling 
account of its faith, hope, and love in the Cathechism of the Catholic Church, just 
as they understood that the reaffirmation of classic Catholic moral theology in Ve-
ritatis Splendor was an impor tant weapon in the war against what John Paul II’s 
successor called the “dictatorship of relativism.” 
And they were prepared to challenge the cul ture—and American politics—
to rediscover the public-policy implications of America’s founding commitment 
to self-evident moral truths; they were not interested, in other words, in finding an 
agree able fifty-yard line. They had learned from John Paul II and the Revolution of 
1989 in east central Europe that seemingly invincible forces could be defeated, and 
they were determined to defeat, not find an ac commodation with, the cultural for-
ces that, in their judgment, were at war with the gospel even as they were eroding 
the fabric of American life.
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There was paradox here. Joseph Bernardin, grow ing up in that part of Ame-
rica where Catholics were most suspect, defined a style of engagement with Ame-
rican public life that put great stress on remain ing “in play.” The bishops who ul-
timately brought an end to the Bernardin Machine and the Bernardin Era grew up 
comfortably Catholic and comfortably American—and then came to understand 
that their Catholicism could require them to be forthrightly countercultural in de-
aling with American culture and politics. The paradox underscored that a sea chan-
ge had taken place, the effects of which were likely to be felt for generations.
The ecclesiastical sensibility that charac terized the Bernardin Era can still 
be discerned in several parts of the complex reality that is the Catholic Church in 
the United States. That sensibility is perhaps most palpably felt in Boston, where 
Father Hehir has wielded considerable influence over archdiocesan af fairs in recent 
years and has done so according to the Bernardin model. The Bernardin ethos is 
also felt within the bishops’ conference bureaucracy, as it is within diocesan bure-
aucracies. But if the Bernardin Era is indeed over, one should expect to see some 
continuing shifts of default position, not least within the bishops’ conference.
The conference might, for example, reexamine its habit of having a comment 
on virtually every contest ed issue in American public life. The late Fr. Richard John 
Neuhaus used to say that, when the Church is not obliged to speak, the Church is 
obliged not to speak; that is, when the issue at hand does not touch a fundamental 
moral truth that the Church is obliged to articulate vigorously in the public-policy 
debate, the Church’s pastors ought to leave the prudential application of principle 
to the laity who, according to Vatican II, are the principal evangelizers of cul ture, 
politics, and the economy. The USCCB’s habit of trying to articulate a Catholic 
response to a very broad range of public-policy issues undercuts this re sponsibility 
of the laity; it also tends to flatten out the bishops’ witness so that all issues become 
equal, which they manifestly are not.
In addition, the conference might reexamine its re liance on domestic policy 
default positions that were set as long ago as 1919, when the National Catholic War 
Council (which begat the National Catholic Welfare Conference, which begat the 
NCCB/USCC dyad, which begat today’s USCCB) issued the Bish ops Program of 
Social Reconstruction. Echoes of that program, filtered through the liberal-con-
sensus politics of the Bernardin Era, could be heard in the 2009 healthcare debate, 
with the bishops continu ally stressing the moral imperative of universal health care. 
That moral imperative exists; but it is not at all clear that meeting it requires a first, 
indeed primary, recourse to governmental means. Or at least that is what the core 
Catholic social–ethical principal of subsidiarity, with its skepticism about concen-
trations of governmental power, would suggest.
Putting that comprehensive vision—universality and subsidiarity—into play 
in the new healthcare debate that will unfold in the wake of Obamacare and the 
2010 midterm elections would be a genuine service to the country, and a distincti-
vely Catholic service. Catholics bring a cluster of concerns to the table of the heal-
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thcare debate: They bring concerns about the unborn, the elderly, and the severely 
handi capped; they bring concerns for the poor and their empowerment; they bring 
concerns for maintaining a healthy pluralism in our national life through the princi-
ple of subsidiarity and the use of private-sector mechanisms for solving social pro-
blems. It would be a real sign of movement beyond the public-policy ori entation 
of the Bernardin Era if that concern for linking universality to subsidiarity (which 
a few bishops began to articulate in 2009) were to achieve a higher prominence in 
the bishops’ address to these issues, even as the USCCB continues to press hard on 
the pro-life agenda and the protection of the conscience rights of Catholic medical 
professionals.
Then there is the question of Catholic identity. Throughout his three-year 
presidency of the USCCB, Francis Cardinal George steered the conference to ward 
a more intense focus on issues of Catholic identity as they touched on the work 
of Catholic colleges and universities, Catholic health care institutions, Catholic 
professional associations, and Catholic publications. Cardinal George’s sense of 
urgency on these questions was primarily ad intra: It was important, he believed, 
for the bishops to take more seriously their roles as stewards of the integrity of 
Catholic identity.
But that internal concern also bore on a public matter the cardinal discussed 
in an important lec ture in February 2010 at Brigham Young University: the ten-
dency in some quarters to privatize religious freedom, reducing that first of human 
rights to a matter of personal conviction and worship. As ag gressive secularists and 
their allies in government continue their efforts to drive religious communities and 
religiously grounded moral argument to the margins of the public-policy debate, 
the post-Bernardin bishops’ conference will be required to be ever more vigilant 
in defending the rights of individual Catholics and the Church as a body to work 
within the democratic process according to religiously informed moral convictions.
Finally, the new era opening up at the USCCB might be the occasion to 
revisit one of the few endur ing effects of “The Challenge of Peace,” namely, its 
contribution to confused Catholic thinking about the intellectual architecture and 
purposes of the just war tradition. The country as a whole remains seriously di-
sabled in its capacity to apply the canons of classic just war reasoning to the new 
world disorder; thus a fresh Catholic discussion of how Christians apply moral 
principles to world affairs would be an impor tant public service.
The Bernardin Era was one of institu tional maintenance and bureaucratic 
expansion in which a liberal consensus dominated both the internal life of the 
Church and the Church’s address to public policy. It is not self-evidently clear what 
the post–Bernardin Era, just beginning, will turn out to be. But if the Church’s or-
dained leaders look to John Paul II as their model, they will increasingly embody 
an evangelical Catholicism that is unafraid to be countercultural in its engagement 
with public life, even as it stresses the imperative of radical conversion to disciple-
ship and friendship with Jesus Christ as the raison d’être of the Church’s existence. 
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If they do so, these new-era bishops will help define a Catholicism in Ame-
rica in which the liberal/con servative taxonomy of the past two generations of Ca-
tholic life will crumble into irrelevance.
“First Things”, February 2011, p. 18–25.
